WASHINGTON / BEIJING, May 10, 2026 —
Key Takeaways
- President Trump departs for Beijing on May 14 for a two-day summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping — the first visit by a U.S. president to China since Trump’s own first-term visit in 2017 — arriving at the most consequential moment in the U.S.-China relationship since the trade war’s peak, with the Iran war having displaced tariffs as the summit’s dominant agenda item.
- China hosted Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi in Beijing this week — the first such visit since the war began February 28 — after which oil prices fell and markets rallied globally, suggesting Beijing used the meeting to convey pressure on Tehran to move toward a deal that reopens the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-third of all Chinese crude oil imports flow.
- The summit’s potential economic deliverables include a 500-aircraft Boeing purchase, a “Board of Trade” institutional framework to replace episodic tariff escalation, partial rollback of rare earth export restrictions, and Chinese agricultural and energy imports — outcomes worth hundreds of billions of dollars in trade that will be negotiated alongside the Iran war in the same two-day window.
Why Iran Has Hijacked the Summit’s Agenda
The Trump-Xi summit was originally scheduled for March and postponed specifically because the Iran war made the diplomatic environment too unstable for a productive meeting. Its rescheduling for May 14-15 came after the ceasefire was extended, oil prices fell from their $114 peak, and the diplomatic track with Iran appeared to be moving toward a memorandum of understanding.
Iran has now reasserted itself at the center of the summit’s agenda in ways neither side fully anticipated. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has publicly confirmed that Iran will be a major topic in Beijing. China hosted Araghchi this week — a visit that multiple analysts describe as Beijing signaling to both the U.S. and Iran that it is positioning itself as a constructive force in the peace process rather than a passive observer.
The diplomatic logic of that positioning is straightforward. China is the world’s largest importer of crude oil. Approximately one-third of its petroleum imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. At current oil prices — Brent crude at $97 after falling from a peak of $114 — China’s oil import bill is running approximately $25 billion per month above its pre-war level. The math of the Strait’s closure is unambiguous for Beijing: every month the Strait remains effectively closed costs China approximately $25 billion in higher energy costs. Beijing has every economic incentive to help close the deal.
The political constraint is that China cannot appear to pressure Iran on behalf of the United States. A China that is seen as enabling American military and economic coercion of Iran loses credibility throughout the developing world and specifically with the Gulf states, African nations, and Southeast Asian countries that constitute China’s alternative trade partnerships. The Araghchi visit was designed to demonstrate that Beijing engages with Tehran as a partner — not as an enforcer of American demands.
What’s Actually on the Table in Beijing — Issue by Issue
| Issue | US Position | China Position | Probability of Progress |
|---|---|---|---|
| Iran war — Strait of Hormuz | Deal requires nuclear concessions | Encourage Iran to reopen Strait — avoid pressuring on nuclear | Medium |
| Tariffs | Maintain 47% effective rate — use as leverage | Return to October 2025 truce terms | Medium |
| Rare earth export controls | Remove Chinese restrictions — critical supply | Use as leverage — may ease selectively | Low-Medium |
| Boeing aircraft purchase | 500 planes — headline deliverable | Willing if broader deal justifies it | Medium-High |
| Board of Trade | Institutionalize bilateral trade management | Supports concept — details contested | Medium |
| Taiwan | Maintain status quo — no concessions | Seek declaratory policy shifts | Low |
| AI governance | Cooperation on safety standards | Interested — but worried about US restrictions | Medium |
| Technology export controls | Maintain controls on advanced chips | Remove or ease — non-negotiable for Beijing | Very Low |
The Boeing aircraft purchase is the summit’s most likely headline deliverable. A Chinese commitment to purchase 500 Boeing planes — or even a letter of intent in that direction — would generate the kind of splashy commercial announcement that both sides can claim as a win. For Trump, it is American jobs and American manufacturing. For Xi, it is a concrete demonstration that the relationship produces economic benefits for China and that engaging Washington is more productive than confronting it.
The rare earth situation is the most consequential strategic issue on the table. China controls approximately 90% of global rare earth processing and has weaponized that dominance by tightening export controls in response to U.S. chip export restrictions. The magnets derived from rare earths are essential components in electric vehicles, wind turbines, military systems, and advanced electronics. A Chinese easing of rare earth export restrictions — even selective and partial — would be received as a major concession. Beijing knows this and will not give it away cheaply.
What Xi Wants — and Why This Summit Matters More for China Than It Does for the US
China enters the Beijing summit in a position it has not been in since the early years of the Trump-era trade war: it is economically strained, diplomatically exposed, and genuinely interested in stabilizing the relationship with Washington for reasons that go beyond optics.
China’s exports to the United States have fallen 11% year-on-year in early 2026, reflecting both the tariff regime and a broader decoupling trend that has accelerated since 2019. The Iran war has pushed up China’s energy costs by an estimated $25 billion per month above baseline. Its property sector remains troubled. Its youth unemployment rate — while not officially published in a form that outside analysts trust — is estimated by independent researchers at above 20%. The economy that Chinese officials describe as resilient is running on stimulus spending and export diversification that are both approaching their limits.
Xi needs the summit to produce enough of a positive signal — lower tariffs, a stable energy environment, access to U.S. technology markets — that Chinese businesses and consumers believe the economy’s difficult period is ending. He will trade something meaningful to get that signal. What he trades, and what Trump asks for, will be determined in a two-day meeting in Beijing beginning four days from now.
The Taiwan Risk Nobody Is Discussing Loudly Enough
Every major analyst who has reviewed the summit’s agenda — CSIS, CFR, Brookings — has raised the same concern: Taiwan. Beijing will push Trump to shift American declaratory policy on Taiwan’s status, constrain arms sales to Taipei, or make some other concession that reduces the strategic protection the United States has provided Taiwan for decades.
Trump’s history with Taiwan is not reassuring to Taipei. He has previously suggested arms sales to Taiwan could be a negotiating chip with Beijing. He called Xi in February and reportedly discussed Taiwan without other officials present. Senior U.S. officials have limited ability to prevent Trump from making verbal commitments in a one-on-one meeting with Xi that subsequent State Department statements attempt to walk back.
Taiwan will be watching May 14-15 more closely than it has watched any diplomatic event since the South China Sea confrontations of 2015. What Trump says or does not say about Taiwan in Beijing — and what he commits to in private — may not become fully public for weeks or months. The consequences, when they do, will shape the Indo-Pacific security environment for years.
